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ACCOUNTING FOR SCIENCE:
THE INDEPENDENCE OF
PUBLIC RESEARCH IN THE
NEW, SUBTERRANEAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DONALD T. HORNSTEIN*
I
INTRODUCTION
The corporate accounting scandals of the early twenty-first century are stark
reminders that “the map is not the territory.”1  In the accounting scandals, stock
valuations dropped when investors lost confidence in corporate earnings reports
giving a true picture of the actual financial territories they purported to map.
Currently, the White House Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) is
putting the final touches on a new system of regulatory accounting, a system
designed to account for the science used by federal agencies in their administra-
tive missions.  In light of the corporate accounting scandals, both the timing and
shape of the new system of accounting for science are remarkable.  It is as if
nothing has been learned.
To be sure, OMB’s program is sometimes explained simply as an attempt to
improve the accuracy of regulatory science.  But there are also reasons for con-
cern that OMB’s new programs could be used to skew the system by which
regulatory science is generated in the first place.  Worse, if abused, the new
program could undermine precisely the type of independence in research that is
currently seen as the necessary corrective policy on the corporate accounting
side.  Just when investment research departments are being insulated from
undue influence, the new accounting for science is actually magnifying the influ-
ence corporations can have on what science tells us about the state of the world.
After detailing the legislative contours of OMB’s new powers, including the
scant record of Congress’s deliberation over them, this Article analyzes their
potential impact—both on the legal regimes affecting regulatory decisionmak-
ing and, perhaps more fundamentally, on the institution of independent scien-
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1. The quotation, although popularized by British essayist Alfred North Whitehead, is attributed
to Polish mathematician Alfred Korzybski.  See ALFRED KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO NON-ARISTOTELIAN SYSTEMS AND GENERAL SEMANTICS 58 (4th ed. 1958).
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tific research itself.  In Part II, this Article identifies within OMB’s programs
the expanded boundaries of a new, subterranean battleground in administrative
law, one in which the scent of future regulation is caught by stakeholders who
then battle to shape the scientific facts on which future regulation may be based.
The result in administrative law terms is something akin to hard-look review
taken across the dimension of time and space.  Now, in the name of ensuring
“good science,” a very hard look indeed is applied almost at the moment of
regulatory conception, when the first factual glimmerings of problems in the
real world begin to be discerned by scientists.  If a new term must be coined for
this development, perhaps it should be known as the “withering-look” doctrine.
So it is that William Kovacs, a vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, predicts that OMB’s new programs “will have the most profound impact
on federal regulations since the Administrative Procedure Act was enacted in
1946 . . . by ensuring that [the Environmental Protection Agency] uses better
science, and by giving industry additional grounds to sue.”2
In Part III, this Article discusses the danger to science itself.  To be clear,
the danger is not simply a heightening of the contest over what constitutes
“good science” that has become such a fixture in health, safety, and environ-
mental rulemaking.  Rather, the danger involves a radical new level of disputa-
tion, in which warring stakeholders can reach back up the scientific pipeline to
federally supported research laboratories and exert a distorting influence on
what is generated in the first place and on what citizens can be told by agencies
about the range of scientific opinion on matters of political concern.  At its
worst, the new program could support an official truth squad of political
appointees at OMB to ensure that all science is “good” and a cadre of
stakeholder vigilantes with the ability to harass scientific researchers who have
produced results with which they disagree.  It is little wonder then, that in con-
trast to the virtual absence of congressional deliberation, implementation of
OMB’s new programs has been opposed at various points by the American
Association for the Advancement of Science,3 the National Academy of Sci-
ences,4 the National Institutes of Health,5  the Council on Undergraduate
Research,6  and the Association of American Universities.7
2. OMB Guidelines on Quality of Information Seen As Having Profound Impact on Agencies, 33
Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 146 (Jan. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Profound Impact].
3. See, e.g., Mary Ellen Sheridan, The University Community and the A-110 Proposed Revision,
Remarks at the American Association for the Advancement of Science and Federal Focus, Inc.’s
Briefing on OMB Revisions to Circular A-110 Regarding Public Access to Data (Feb. 26, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/sfrl/projects/omb/sheridan.htm (stating support for sharing of data
generally, but noting that under the Shelby Amendment “the private sector could use the FOIA [Free-
dom of Information Act] tool for raiding basic research and scientific data that are being federally
funded” causing “silence, because investigators would feel that they could not share with the agencies
that had funded them what was happening in the laboratory”).
4. At hearings before House Government Management, Information and Technology Subcom-
mittee, Bruce Alberts, president of the National Academy of Sciences, and Harold Vamus, director of
the National Institutes of Health, discussed “how the new law . . . could force scientists to surrender
incomplete and confidential information while inviting special interest groups to harass investigators
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The new programs, moreover, accelerate an already dangerous erosion in
the independence of scientific research, especially on university campuses.  In
part because of reductions in public financial support, universities have been all
too willing to participate financially in corporate-sponsored research on cam-
pus.  In his (in)famous “report before leaving the Harvard presidency,” Derek
Bok “warned against [the increasing trend toward] entrepreneurial behavior by
university” researchers and administrators.8  Numerous reports have concluded
that universities often lack even the most basic internal mechanisms for assuring
the independence of corporate-sponsored research on campus.9  Journals such
as the Chronicle of Higher Education regularly cite examples of corporate pres-
sure on university-based researchers.10  The new OMB programs exacerbate the
problem.  Among other things, one of the new programs opens potential path-
ways for influencing research supported with public funds, while leaving outside
its ambit an equal concern for on-campus research funded solely by corpora-
tions.  Yet the risks of error in environmental, health, and safety data—the jus-
tification for the new endeavors—are equally, if not more, likely to occur in
corporate research.  Corporate research can be influenced by result-minded
corporate funders and, increasingly, by financial conflicts of interest in the
researchers themselves.  Thus, the design of the new accounting for science is
startling.  Precisely at the time when reformers are trying to purge corporate
accounting from the distorting influence of underlying conflicts of interest, a
new system of accounting for science is being implemented that aggravates just
those types of distortions.
engaged in controversial or competing work.” Joint Steering Committee for Public Policy, A-110/FOIA
Issue (Mar. 23, 2000), at http://www.jscpp.org/A-110.htm [hereinafter Joint Steering Committee].
5. Id.
6. Letter from K. Elaine Hoagland, National Executive Officer, Council on Undergraduate
Research, to Brooke Dickson, Office of Management and Budget (July 6, 2001), available at
http://www.cur.org/wp_OMBreg.html [hereinafter Hoagland Letter] (responding to federal registry
notice on data integrity and stating that “The Council On Undergraduate Research is concerned that
this proposed rule, intended to ensure objectivity and integrity of information, would do just the oppo-
site by allowing, even requiring, the tampering of data in the name of ‘correcting’ it”).
7. Letter from Nils Hasselmo, President, Association of American Universities, and C. Peter
Magrath, President, National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, to the Office
of Management and Budget (Aug. 13, 2001), available at http://www.aau.edu/research/OMBLtr8.13.01
.html [hereinafter Hasselmo Letter] (“We believe the imposition of new, redundant tests and checklists
that must be satisfied before information is released may be contradictory to the goal of transparency in
government. . . . Furthermore, we are concerned that this test may provide still another avenue for
interested parties to impede release by the government of material to which they object on political or
economic grounds.”).
8. Kenneth Sutherline Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Devel-
oped Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 483 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Rachel Zimmerman, Corporate Hand in Clinical Trials is Criticized, WALL ST. J., Oct.
24, 2002, at D8 (reporting that “according to a study [of 108 research institutions] published [that day]
in the New England Journal of Medicine. . . . in many cases, research contracts between academic insti-
tutions and companies fail to adhere to minimal standards of accountability. . . . [and] that academic
institutions rarely ensure that researchers participate in the design of the clinical trial and control edito-
rial and publication decisions”).
10. See infra notes 60, 69, 70, 85.
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II
THE DATA AMENDMENTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW,
SUBTERRANEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Data Amendments
At the core of OMB’s new programs are two relatively short congressional
amendments to appropriations bills.  The first is a one-sentence amendment
introduced by Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) to a 4000-page fiscal year 1999
appropriations bill, often called the “Data Access” or “Shelby Amendment.”11
The Shelby Amendment mandated an important change in OMB “Circular A-
110,” which governs the conditions under which the federal government admin-
isters discretionary grants, including grants to university researchers made by
the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and other
“awarding agencies.”  The Amendment directs “[t]he Director of OMB [to]
amend[] Section .36 of OMB Circular A-110 to require Federal awarding agen-
cies to ensure that all data produced under an award will be made available to
the public through the procedures established under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act.”12
However modest the Shelby Amendment’s modification to Circular A-110
might appear, it had the effect of overturning Forsham v. Harris,13 a decision in
which the Supreme Court concluded that “data generated by a privately con-
trolled organization which has received grant funds from an agency . . . but
which data has not . . . been obtained by the agency, are not ‘agency records’
accessible under the [Freedom of Information Act].”14  Despite having the effect
of overturning twenty years of law and practice regarding grantee autonomy,
the Shelby Amendment was all but invisible throughout the legislative process.
Of course, there was (and still is) a legitimate, open public debate over the
timing and scope of scientists’ obligations to share their underlying data.15
There was little focused attention, however, on the Shelby Amendment when it
sought to impose a federal solution onto this debate.  The Shelby Amendment
was not the subject of any contemporaneous committee hearings,16 and its leg-
11. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
12. Id.  The amendment further authorizes a reasonable fee for acquiring the data.  Id. (“[I]f the
agency obtaining the data does so solely at the request of a private party, the agency may authorize a
reasonable user fee equaling the incremental cost of obtaining the data.”).
13. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
14. Id. at 178.
15. See, e.g., Sheridan, supra note 3 (“First, let me firmly state that the university scientific commu-
nity is the strongest voice for data access, for the right to use data in an unfettered way, and for the
public dissemination of new knowledge. . . . [W]e spend most of our time negotiating so that we ensure
that privilege, and we uphold that academic principle when we interact with industry, the federal gov-
ernment, or any private sponsor.”).
16. See, e.g., Senator Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to Federally
Funded Research Data, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 378-79 (2000) (referring to language in committee
reports, colloquies on the Senate floor, language in bill, but not to contemporaneous hearings).  The
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islative history otherwise consisted mostly of staged colloquies17 and a few cur-
sory sentences in the various committee reports that accompanied the massive
budget bill.18
When the Shelby Amendment became visible, it soon became evident that
the silence with which it had been accompanied did not reflect unanimous sci-
entific or political support.  After OMB proposed specific revisions to Circular
A-110 to implement the legislation in August 1999, it received over 3000 written
comments in opposition, including written opposition on behalf of the National
Science Foundation, the Association of American Universities, and the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science.19  Representatives Jim Walsh
(R-NY) and David Price (D-NC) introduced a rider to the Fiscal Year 2000
Treasury and Postal Appropriations bill that would have postponed the Shelby
Amendment’s implementation, but it was rejected by the full House Appropria-
tions Committee on a divided 22-35 vote, mostly along party lines.20  Two days
after that defeat, hearings were begun before the House Government Manage-
ment, Information, and Technology Subcommittee, to consider House Bill 88,
introduced by Representative George Brown (D-CA), which would have
repealed the Shelby Amendment for federal researchers.21  At those hearings,
repeal of the Shelby Amendment was supported by, among other organizations,
the National Academy of Sciences and the National Institutes of Health.22  But
Representative Brown died the day after the hearings began, and House Bill 88
lost its impetus.23  To be sure, none of this undermines the inescapable fact that
the Shelby Amendment was a validly enacted appropriations-bill rider and that
it has survived at least two attempted repeals.  It is equally clear, however, that
at the time of its passage, the Shelby Amendment was mostly flying under the
political radar screen.
following exchange occurred at a National Academy of Sciences workshop between Jim Tozzi of the
Center for Regulatory Effectiveness and David Hawkins of the Natural Resources Defense Council:
Mr. Tozzi:  First of all, the majority of the Senate and House looked at . . . arguments to
determine that the existing administrative procedures act and how you get that data was not
sufficient.
Mr. Hawkins:  Would you cite us the hearings that they undertook to do that?
Mr. Tozzi:  I can give you committee reports.  I am not an expert on hearings.
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, WORKSHOP: SEEKING ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (March 12, 2001), at 71-72, available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/Access
_Transcript_June_2001.doc [hereinafter NAS DATA ACCESS WORKSHOP].
17. See Shelby, supra note 16, at 378-79 (“At that time [October 9, 1998], Senators Lott, Campell,
and I again engaged in a colloquy on the floor to discuss the challenges that were made in confer-
ence.”).
18. See id.
19. See American Acad. of Arts & Sciences, Center for Science, Technology & Congress, Strong
Response for Proposed Circular Change (June 1999), at http://www.aaas.org/spp/cstc/bulletin/articles/6-
99/OMBA-110.htm [hereinafter Strong Response]; Efforts Underway to Block Implementation of
Changes to OMB Circular A-110 (May 18, 1999), at http://globalchange.gov/policies/comments/
0001.html.
20. See Joint Steering Committee, supra note 4.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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The other statutory basis for OMB’s new programs had an equally innocu-
ous beginning.  Near the end of Congress’s consideration of another massive
appropriations bill, Representative Jo Ann Emerson (R-MO) introduced a
short rider that added section 515 to the Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2001.24  Section 515 addressed the subject of
data quality, rather than data access, and, thus, is known as the “Data Quality
Act.”25  Section 515(a) of the Act directs OMB, by September 30, 2001, to issue
“policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maxi-
mizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information . . . dissemi-
nated by Federal agencies.”26  Section 515(b) then directs OMB to require fed-
eral agencies to adopt their own data quality guidelines within one year and
establish administrative mechanisms by which “affected persons” can “seek and
obtain correction of information . . . that does not comply with the guidelines.”27
As with the Shelby Amendment, the Data Quality Act hardly commanded
widespread legislative attention.  Even Dr. John Graham, the OMB official
later appointed to be in charge of administering the statute, conceded that “the
law was enacted as a rider to an appropriations bill without any hearings or
extensive legislative history.”28
Given the lack of legislative history, one might well wonder about the design
and regulatory philosophy underlying these laws.  After all, as to data access, at
24. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-153-154 (2000).
25. The Act is sometimes called the “Daughter of Shelby” by its critics.  To be sure, there is some
overlap between the two provisions.  Dr. John Graham, the director of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, has described the two statutes as “mutually reinforcing.”  NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI.,
ENSURING THE QUALITY OF DATA DISSEMINATED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: WORKSHOP #
1, at 9 (Mar. 11, 2002) [hereinafter NAS WORKSHOP, DAY 1], available at http://www7.nationalacad
emies.org/stl/4-22-02_Transcript.doc (comments of John D. Graham).  Nonetheless, to avoid confusion
with the focus of the Shelby Amendment on data access, this Article does not refer to the Data Quality
Act as the “Daughter of Shelby Act.”
26. § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-153-154.
27. Id. at 114 Stat. 2763A-154.  Section 515(b) provides that the OMB guidelines shall:
(1) apply to the sharing by Federal agencies of, and access to, information disseminated by
Federal agencies; and
(2) require that each Federal agency to which the guidelines apply—
(A) issue guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity
of information (including statistical information) disseminated by the agency, by not later
than 1 year after the date of issuance of the guidelines under subsection (a);
 (B) establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain
correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not
comply with the guidelines issued under subsection (a); and
(C) report periodically to the Director—
(i) the number and nature of complaints received by the agency regarding the accu-
racy of information disseminated by the agency; and
(ii) how such complaints were handled by the agency.
Id.
28. NAS WORKSHOP, DAY 1, supra note 25, at 9; see also id. at 32 (statement of Alan Morrison,
Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School) (“The Data Quality Act is a statute that is quite
short. . . . It is only a couple of paragraphs, and the good news and the bad news about the legislative
history is the same news.  There isn’t any.”).
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the time the provisions were enacted, general principles of administrative law
gave interested persons fairly wide-ranging access to the facts, assumptions, and
regulatory alternatives considered by agencies in carrying out their rulemaking
functions.29  As to data quality, agencies, particularly the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”), often had in place fairly dense systems of data-quality
control, complete with internal peer-review mechanisms, scientific advisory
committees, and the ability to enlist the aid of outside scientific institutions for
quality checks.30
B. The Emergence of the New, Subterranean Administrative Law
Defenders of both the Shelby Amendment and the Data Quality Act (the
“Data Amendments”) are surprisingly transparent in, and indeed often openly
boastful of, their shared opposition to government regulation on philosophical,
rather than scientific, grounds.  Thus, for example, when written comments on
OMB’s data access proposal were heavily trending in the direction of scientific
organizations and others opposed to the Shelby Amendment, a counter-cam-
paign of supporting letters was organized by such conservative groups as the
National Rifle Association, the Eagle Forum, and the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce.31  The thinly veiled philosophical opposition to regulation was perhaps
reflected best in letters sent from members of the Gun Owners of America, who
supported aggressive implementation of the Shelby Amendment so as to
“expose all the phony science used to justify many restrictions on firearms own-
ership.”32
It may have been Senator Shelby himself who revealed the link between his
Amendment and broader, more political, disagreements over regulatory policy.
Specifically, the Shelby Amendment grew out of a substantive disagreement
with EPA over air pollution regulation.  Writing with refreshing candor about
29. See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that judicial
review of agency action “evince[s] a concern that variables be accounted for, that the representative-
ness of test conditions be ascertained, that the validity of tests be assured and the statistical significance
of results determined”); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating
that an agency must indicate in the rulemaking record “centrally important data” so that the public may
make meaningful comments).
30. See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 574 (1992) (“Between 1975 and 1978, Congress
authorized [EPA] to establish a Scientific Advisory Panel to review the scientific bases of pesticide
risks, a Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee to review the risk assessments underlying air quality
standards, and the Science Advisory Board to review EPA’s research initiatives and science-based
policy determinations.”).  See generally SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS
AS POLICYMAKERS (1990).
31. Strong Response, supra note 19.
32. Id.  It was not unusual for gun-ownership organizations to pay attention to the role science can
play in political disputes.  In 1997, an article in the New England Journal of Medicine contended that
the National Rifle Association tried to eliminate funding for the National Center for Injury Prevention
and Control because of opposition to studies highlighting the dangers of keeping guns in the home.  See
Richard A. Deyo et al., The Messenger Under Attack—Intimidation of Researchers by Special-Interest
Groups, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1176 (1997) (citing J. Kassirer, A Partisan Assault on Science—the
Threat to CDC, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 793 (1995)).
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the Amendment, Senator Shelby acknowledged that “[w]hile access to data and
quality of data issues are not new, the pressing need for additional access was
highlighted by the controversial National Air and Ambient Quality Standards
(“NAAQS”) rule on ozone and particulate matter proposed by [EPA] in
1997.”33
EPA’s proposed revisions of the ozone and particulate-matter NAAQSs
were an undeniably visible part of the political landscape in 1997 and 1998.
Because they raised the possibility of sweeping many of the country’s urban and
suburban areas into “nonattainment” status under the federal Clean Air Act,
EPA’s proposed rules faced a barrage of organized opposition, including highly
visible congressional oversight hearings and the introduction of bills that would
have specifically postponed revision of the standards.34  Thus, it is noteworthy
that Senator Shelby, in his own explanation of the his Amendment, elaborated
that it was not simply an intellectual commitment to data access that motivated
his concern but instead his personal conviction that especially strong data were
needed to outweigh the compliance costs of the new ozone and particulate-
matter rules.  As the Senator put it:
[T]his wide disparity in potential costs fueled controversy over the data used to sup-
port the proposal . . . . My unsuccessful effort to gain public access to the data sup-
porting the EPA’s controversial NAAQS rule reinforced my belief that greater access
to research data is necessary to ensure both that the best science is being used to sup-
port our federal rules and policies, and that federally funded agencies and researchers
feel a greater sense of accountability to the public.35
The problem with Senator Shelby’s concern over regulatory costs, of course,
is that the Supreme Court squarely rejected it in February 2001 in Whitman v.
American Trucking Associations,36 in which the Court upheld precisely these
same ozone and particulate-matter rules and held that the Clean Air Act indeed
forbids the balancing of compliance costs against evidence that regulation is
needed to protect public health.37  The problem with Senator Shelby’s concern
over the scientific basis of EPA’s standards is that the agency’s actions here,
too, have been validated—both in the courts and in subsequent scientific analy-
sis.  The precise scientific dispute over these NAAQSs deserves special discus-
sion and is considered below.  As to the most recent judicial determination,
however, on remand from the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit unanimously
33. Shelby, supra note 16, at 373.
34. See, e.g., Backers of Air Rules Claim Enough Support to Uphold Veto of Bill to Block Stan-
dards, 28 Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 654 (Aug. 8, 1997); EPA Not Backing Down on Air Standards
As Discussions Continue at White House, 28 Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 301 (June 13, 1997); House
Democrats Seek Talks With Clinton Over Proposed Changes to Ozone, PM Rules, 28 Env’t Rep. (BNA)
No. 1, at 5 (May 2, 1997); Missouri GOP Senators, Businesses Oppose Ozone, Particulate Standards, 27
Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 2022 (Feb. 7, 1997); Moderates in Senate Seek United Position on Propos-
als to Tighten Ozone, PM rules, 28 Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 262 (June 6, 1997); Ozone-PM Rules
Survive Attack in Senate, Still Face Challenge in House This Year, 28 Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1369
(Nov. 14, 1997).
35. Shelby, supra note 16, at 373, 376.
36. 531 U.S. 457 (2001) [hereinafter Am. Trucking I].
37. Id. at 469-71.
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upheld the revised ozone and particulate-matter NAAQSs against industry’s
arguments that the revisions were arbitrary and capricious.38  As to the particu-
late-matter standard, the court found that EPA had sufficient evidence after an
“exhaustive rule-making process” to “substantiate[] its judgment regarding the
inadequacy of the old particulate matter standards.”39  As to the revised ozone
standard of .08 parts per million (“ppm”), the court found that the agency had
engaged in “reasoned decision-making” in following the advice of a majority of
EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, which believed that the exist-
ing standard needed to be revised from its current .12 ppm to the .07-.09 ppm
range.40
Yet, Senator Shelby may well get the last laugh.  The American Trucking
litigation is, in reality, a watershed event, framing especially well the dividing
line between conventional administrative law and the emergence of the new,
subterranean administrative law.  Conventionally understood, the American
Trucking litigation confirmed the “classic” administrative law vision of agency
decisionmaking.  Under this vision, perhaps the most widely noted element of
the Supreme Court’s American Trucking opinion was its unanimous endorse-
ment of the current nondelegation doctrine.  Here, the Court confirmed that
Congress may delegate important discretionary policy-making tasks to agencies
so long as, in the delegating legislation, Congress itself sets forth “intelligible
principles” to guide agency action.41  With this holding, the Court had little
trouble finding that the Clean Air Act contains just such broad principles,
including Congress’s unambiguous intent for EPA to vigorously set health-pro-
tective NAAQSs “with an adequate margin of safety,” without consideration
for the costs of adopting such standards.42  So too, on remand, the D.C. Circuit’s
American Trucking II opinion reflects the classic administrative law vision.
Specifically, the Court found that Congress wanted EPA to act proactively in
revising standards based on the “best available evidence,” even if there remain
some uncertainties in the science:
Thus, EPA’s inability to guarantee the accuracy or increase the precision of the PM2.5
NAAQS in no way undermines the standards’ validity.  Rather, these limitations indi-
cate only that significant scientific uncertainty remains about the health effects of fine
particulate matter at low atmospheric concentrations.  As the exhaustive rulemaking
process makes clear . . . EPA set the primary NAAQS notwithstanding that uncer-
tainty, just as the Act requires.43
Yet the conventional understanding, confirmed in the American Trucking
litigation, of an expert agency following statutory principles to set timely, proac-
tive, health-protective standards, no longer reflects the underlying reality.  In
fact, despite having “won” in 1997 the right to have proactively revised ozone
38. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Am. Trucking II].
39. Id. at 370-71.
40. Id. at 375-76, 379.
41. Am. Trucking I, 531 U.S. at 472.
42. Id. at 475-76.
43. Am. Trucking II, 283 F.3d at 370.
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and particulate-matter standards based on the best available evidence, EPA
subsequently announced that its revised particulate-matter standard would
“have no actual regulatory impact” until 2002 when further scientific analysis,
including a study by the National Research Council (“NRC”), would retroac-
tively confirm the wisdom of its action.44  Yet NRC’s progress report in 2002 on
restudying the effects of airborne particulates has only confirmed the wisdom of
the revisions announced in 1997 by reinforcing the likelihood that as many as
15,000 excess deaths were—and are—occurring annually under the outdated
standard.45  Thus, at least to the 75,000 statistical persons who since 1997 may
have died preventable deaths under the old standard but who were able to
enjoy none of the benefits projected under the revised standard, EPA’s victo-
ries in court are cold comfort indeed.
The guerilla warfare that has in fact replaced the conventional model of
agency action reflected in American Trucking is now institutionalized for all
regulatory decisionmaking through the Shelby Amendment and the Data
Quality Act.  Indeed, the difference between the optimistic, and increasingly
out-of-touch, conventional view of administrative action, and the new, subter-
ranean administrative law was foreshadowed by the D.C. Circuit itself in
American Trucking II.  There, industry opponents of the revised standards
argued that EPA’s decisions were reversible for the agency’s failure to release
all “underlying data” from the studies on which the agency was relying that
indicated public-health risks.  The court was under no illusions about the bur-
dens that would attend such a data-access requirement.  As the court con-
cluded:
[W]e agree with EPA that requiring agencies to obtain and publicize the data under-
lying all studies on which they rely “would be impractical and unnecessary.”  As EPA
persuasively stated . . . : “If EPA and other governmental agencies could not rely on
published studies without conducting an independent analysis of the enormous vol-
ume of raw data underlying them, then much plainly relevant scientific information
would become unavailable to EPA for use in setting standards to protect public health
and the environment . . . .”46
The court’s conclusions that nothing in conventional administrative law does, or
should, require such hyper-analysis only serves as a counterpoint to the possi-
bility that just such hyper-analysis in  the name of “good science” is what will
become de rigeur under the Shelby Amendment and the Data Quality Act.
In short, the way the game is played under the new, subterranean adminis-
trative law may now come to trump, in practical operation at least, the way the
44. Nat’l Acad. of Sciences, Background Information on “Research Priorities for Airborne Par-
ticulate Matter” (2002), at http://dels.nas.edu/best/pm/ (last visited June 24, 2003).
45. Id.; see also BD. OF ENVTL. STUDIES & TOXICOLOGY, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES,
ESTIMATING THE PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS OF PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS 9 (2002),
available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309086094/html/ [hereinafter NAS, PUBLIC HEALTH
BENEFITS] (“Overall, the committee found that the epidemiological studies selected by EPA for use in
its benefits analyses were generally defensible.”).
46. Am. Trucking II, 283 F.3d at 372 (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,689).
HORNSTEIN.DOC 02/11/04  4:18 PM
Autumn 2003] ACCOUNTING FOR SCIENCE 237
game was supposed to be played under the conventional American Trucking
model.
C. The Hyper-search for “Good Science” Under the Data Amendments
It does not take long to worry about the institution of science amidst calls by
policy-makers, many of them legally trained, for regulators to follow the an-
swers given by “good science.”  Ostensibly, the call for good science rests on
unease with adversarial systems—and, increasingly, a more deep-seated antipa-
thy toward legal-political systems—for making decisions in which scientific
information plays a role.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,47 if not a perfect metaphor for this position, is often
used as a banner.  For those carrying the banner, Daubert is read as contrasting
the kind of “junk science” that can be procured by self-interested litigants in
courtroom tort litigation with “good science” produced by disinterested scien-
tists under the norms of the scientific method and peer review.  Proponents of
“good science” do not restrict their agendas to science in the courtroom.  As
this Symposium reflects, the banner is now raised to “Daubertize” administra-
tive agencies.  Indeed, the Data Amendments are regularly defended simply as
measures to ensure that agencies, too, look only to “good science” for answers.48
Yet the lessons of EPA’s ozone and particulate-matter revisions suggest that
when “good science” is held up to a mirror, many of its proponents want only to
see one thing—”my science.”  In fact, this result-oriented approach is nicely
framed in industry’s contrasting positions toward science in Daubert and the
American Trucking litigation.  In Daubert, industry opposed the introduction of
testimony on the possibility of birth defects caused by Bendectin, an anti-nau-
sea medication administered to pregnant women, because this testimony would
have relied on theoretical inferences from animal-cell studies, live-animal stud-
ies, and chemical-structure studies.  In the industry’s view, the question of cau-
sation was properly framed only by peer-reviewed epidemiological studies of
Bendectin’s actual effects in the real world, which, it was argued, suggested little
basis for finding Bendectin to cause birth defects in humans.49
In American Trucking, EPA based its action on the weight of just such peer-
reviewed, epidemiological studies—in that case suggesting some 15,000 to
20,000 excess deaths (and many thousands more episodes of excess disease)
were occurring annually across the United States from exposure to ozone and
particulates under the then-existing standards.  Among these studies, EPA
47. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
48. See, e.g., Shelby, supra note 16, at 376 (stating that the Shelby Amendment was designed to
minimize the “use of ‘junk science’”).
49. Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs, the Twists, and the
Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Function to Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evi-
dence: Kuhmo’s Expansion of Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689, 704 n.58 (2000) (discussing the Ben-
dectin litigation and contrasting the industry’s reliance on “information published on Bendectin” result-
ing from “tests based on human statistics” and the testimony of plaintiff’s experts based on animal-cell
studies, live-animal studies, and chemical structure analysis).
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relied on the so-called “Six Cities Study,” which was a twenty-year longitudinal
collection of studies measuring air-pollution effects among thousands of people
in diverse settings—a massive research effort that alone had spawned over 100
publications.50  Dr. Douglas Dockery, one of the principal investigators of the
Six Cities Study, later testified to a workshop of the National Academy of Sci-
ences that “what we found was that, even as we adjusted for sex, age, and ciga-
rette smoking, occupation, education, obesity, and chronic disease history, peo-
ple living in areas with higher air pollution, as determined by the fine particle
concentrations, had a shorter life expectancy than people living in the cleaner
cities.”51
Throughout the congressional hearings in 1997 over EPA’s proposed revi-
sions, industry critics and their congressional allies repeatedly sought to chal-
lenge the Six Cities Study on numerous grounds: failure to adequately consider
other possible confounding factors, failure to precisely define a safe ambient
level for particulates, and lack of access to the data “underlying” the study,
apparently including the detailed confidential medical information provided to
the researchers by thousands of citizen-participants.  For present purposes,
what matters is not the likelihood that any of these objections had merit (which
is discussed below) but instead the complete sea-change in industry’s objections
to precisely the type of peer-reviewed epidemiology that had been held up as
the gold standard in Daubert.  Of course, what had changed in the case of air
pollution was that the results of the science did not favor industry.  The only
“good science” apparently was “my science.”
Still, the furor over EPA’s revised standards might have reflected only the
not-uncommon occurrence of organized opposition to an agency’s rulemaking.
The story might have ended simply with concessions by EPA to these political
realities.  Certainly, such concessions were made.  During its rulemaking pro-
cess, although EPA refused to obtain and release the confidential medical infor-
mation underlying the Six Cities Study, the agency did agree to direct an inde-
pendent evaluation of the study by the Health Effects Institute (“HEI”), a
respected scientific organization partially funded by the automobile industry.
The Harvard researchers allowed the HEI access to the underlying data, and
the HEI confirmed after review both the study’s methodology and its substan-
tive results.52  EPA also agreed (perhaps in light of the American Trucking liti-
gation then pending) to postpone implementation of its revised standards until
its next five-year NAAQSs review, scheduled for 2002.  The D.C. Circuit com-
pleted the American Trucking litigation in March 2002 by upholding the scien-
tific underpinnings of EPA’s revisions from attack on arbitrary-and-capricious
grounds.53  In the meantime, however, congressional opponents of implementa-
50. See Am. Trucking II, 283 F.3d at 364-65; see also NAS DATA ACCESS WORKSHOP, supra note
16, at 24-26.
51. Id. at 28.
52. See Elizabeth Adelman, Data Wars: How Superseding Forsham v. Harris Impacts the Federal
Grant Award Process, 21 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 105, 105-06 (2001).
53. Am. Trucking II, 283 F.3d at 379.
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tion of the revised standards included $46.6 million in yet another appropria-
tions bill for a second, “independent” analysis of the health effects of particu-
late matter, this time by the National Academy of Sciences.54  In July 2002, the
NRC published a preliminary review that, although suggesting any number of
refinements for the long-term study of particulate matter, otherwise supported
the general validity of the science underlying EPA’s revised standards.55  It
bears repeating that those standards are necessary to address some 15,000 early
deaths caused by the existing unhealthy levels of air pollution we still breathe
today.
The real story of the revised NAAQSs battle, however, was that its oppo-
nents were so result-oriented that they suggested mechanisms—the Data
Amendments—designed to intersect the underlying scientific process by which
results such as these could be generated in the first place.  Thus, rather than rely
on the virtues of peer review as an indicator of scientific reliability as they had
in Daubert, proponents of “good science” now regularly note the limitations of
peer review amidst their suggestions that something else is needed.56  For exam-
ple, rather than rely on the virtues of scientific review by independent organiza-
tions, as they did in demanding review of the Six Cities Study by the HEI and
then the National Academy of Sciences, proponents of “good science” now
argue that any member of “the public” should be allowed access to any study
referenced by agencies and that any “affected person” should be allowed to
lodge objections to data quality with agencies, with those objections in turn
reviewable not by independent scientific organizations but by OMB and, per-
haps, Members of Congress.57  Lest anyone doubt the possibility that within
these new arrangements, “good science” can be attacked until it resembles “my
science,” William Kovacs of the United States Chamber of Commerce, when
asked what he would do if given access to the data underlying the Harvard Six
Cities Study (data that has been twice corroborated by independent analyses)
responded simply, and undoubtedly honestly, that he would re-analyze it.58
To appreciate the possibilities of corporate pressure on publicly funded
researchers through the Data Amendments, one need only consider the extent
to which, as a general matter, the shape and content of university-based
research has already been subject to corporate pressure.
54. Id.
55. NAS, PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 45, at 4.
56. Thus, Senator Shelby explains the need for data access: “The scientific community itself has
acknowledged that peer review can vary widely in quality and outcome . . . . [I]ndeed, the peer and
agency review process has proved to be insufficient as a means of validating data.”  Shelby, supra note
16, at 375.
57. See Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-154 (Data Quality Act) (2000) (permit-
ting “affected persons” to make data-quality objections); Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Shelby
Amendment) (1998) (requiring underlying data to be made available to “the public”).
58. Profound Impact, supra note 2, at 147.
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III
THE GENERAL INCREASE IN CORPORATE INFLUENCE OVER RESEARCH
A. The Status Quo
To set the stage for a brief analysis of university-based research, it is worth
elaborating how significant the growth has been in corporate-sponsored
research on campus.  To some extent, this is a function of a reduction in federal
financial support for university research (which fell between 1969 and 1990
from over 19% to 12%),59 not to mention the reduction in overall public finan-
cial support for colleges and universities in general (which fell, for example, in
Canada from 60% in 1980 to 40% in 1999).60  By necessity, therefore, universi-
ties have had to look elsewhere for support.  Corporations’ interests in univer-
sity-based research in the United States undoubtedly also stem from the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980,61  which allowed universities to patent the results of research
that had been funded through federal grants, thereby opening the possibility of
earning royalties by licensing innovations to private corporations.62  Before
1980, universities were producing about 250 patents per year; in 1998 alone,
universities produced over 4800 patent applications.63
There is no mistaking an increase in the research relationships between pri-
vate corporations and universities.  An editorial in the journal Science noted
that, as of 1996, corporate funding had grown markedly to comprise up to 7%
of “overall university research” budgets.64  For research in the life sciences gen-
erally, estimates of the share of corporate funding in the mid-1990s ranged
between 9%65 and 11%.66  At some universities, corporate research support is
higher.  At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example, even in
1986 industrial funding comprised 15% of the overall research budget, and at
Carnegie-Mellon University, this figure was 23%.67  There are also particular
areas where corporate support is especially marked.  In the field of biomedical
research, between 1980 and 2000, corporate funding grew to comprise 62% of
59. Melissa S. Anderson, The Complex Relations Between the Academy and Industry, 72 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 226, 231 (2001).
60. Paul Desruisseaux, Canadian Professors Decry Power of Companies in Campus Research,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 12, 1999, at A59.
61. Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
62. See Council on Governmental Relations, The Bayh-Dole Act: A Guide to the Law and Imple-
menting Regulations (Sept. 1999), at http://www.cogr.edu/bayh-dole.htm.
63. Anderson, supra note 59, at 234.
64. Dorothy S. Zinberg, Editorial, A Cautionary Tale, 273 SCIENCE 411, 411 (1996).
65. David Blumenthal et al., Participation of Life-Science Faculty in Research Relationships with
Industry, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1734, 1738 (1996) (using 1995 data).
66. David Blumenthal et al., Relationships between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life
Sciences—An Industry Survey, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 369 (1996) (using 1994 data).
67. Wayne Biddle, Corporations on Campus, 237 SCIENCE 353, 353 (1987).
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spending on such research nationally.68  The medical school at Washington Uni-
versity in St. Louis has a formal arrangement with Monsanto that has, since
1982, produced $150 million in basic-research money for the university.69  In
1998, the College of Natural Resources at the University of California at Ber-
keley announced a five-year, $25 million “‘strategic alliance’” with Novartis
(since absorbed by Syngenta) that provides to every participating professor in
the Berkeley plant-biology department annual awards ranging from $60,000 to
$200,000.70
The trend does not necessarily reflect a one-sided scenario of industries
seducing otherwise innocent academic departments.  Universities, for their part,
are often more eager than corporations to form alliances.  The Berkeley-Novar-
tis arrangement, for example, was instigated by the university itself when
Gordon Rausser, Dean of the Natural Resources College, sent inquiries to six-
teen agricultural, biotechnology, and life sciences companies.71  A published
study of university-business partnerships revealed that, as a general matter, uni-
versities were too eager to enter into such partnerships because they were
“overestimating the opportunities for financial gain and underestimating the
financial risks.”72  Before leaving the Harvard presidency in 1991, Derek Bok
observed that universities “appear less and less as charitable institutions seeking
the truth and serving students and more and more as huge commercial opera-
tions that differ from corporations only because there are no shareholders and
no dividends.”73
The linkage between industry and business does not necessarily mean a
reduction in scientific quality.  Despite the severity of his outgoing assessment
of the trend, Bok had claimed in the 1980s that “‘the participation of Harvard
and its professors in commercial ventures can be structured in ways that are
wholly consistent with its academic values.’”74  And in 1996, Bok was quoted for
the somewhat less alarming prediction that, “the price of corporate support is
eternal vigilance.”75  Nor was Bok alone in this relative complacency:  only three
of fifty-nine respondents to a survey of academic researchers in 1997 believed
that “the costs of academic capitalism [were] in excess of benefits.”76
68. Robert Lee Hotz, Medical Tests Skewed, Study Finds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003, at A14
(reporting on a study by Yale University researchers published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association).
69. Goldie Blumenstyk, Berkeley Pact With a Swiss Company Takes Technology Transfer to a New
Level, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 11, 1998, at A56.
70. Goldie Blumenstyk, A Vilified Corporate Partnership Produces Little Change (Except Better
Facilities), CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 22, 2001, at A24.
71. Blumenstyk, supra note 69.
72. NORMAN E. BOWIE, UNIVERSITY–BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS: AN ASSESSMENT 57 (1994).
73. Dueker, supra note 8, at 483 (quoting Derek Bok).
74. Id. (quoting Derek Bok).
75. Zinberg, supra note 64, at 411 (quoting Bok’s statements at a seminar on university-industry
relations).
76. Anderson, supra note 59 (citing Slaughter & Leslie).
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There is also evidence, however, that the link between universities and
commercial ventures creates the potential for bias in commercially financed
research.  There is, of course, some anecdotal evidence of outright pressure on
university researchers by their corporate funders.  An article in the journal Sci-
ence in November 2000 illustrated just such a dispute involving university-based
researchers Drs. James Kahn and Stephan Lagakos.77  Kahn and Lagakos, who
had been asked to evaluate a large clinical trial of HIV-related medication,
alleged that the corporate funder of the trial tried to block publication of their
study, which had found that the drug provided no clinical benefit, unless the
study included the company’s analysis that some of the data indicated that the
drug could help some people.78  Other anecdotal evidence can also be found.79
The bigger concern, however, involves the possibility that corporate spon-
sorship influences the mindset of university researchers, who edit themselves
lest they jeopardize their sponsors.  Drummond Rennie, an editor at the Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association, believes that many academic research-
ers, unlike Kahn and Lagakos, would “keep quiet to avoid angering corporate
sponsors.”80  Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England Journal of Medi-
cine, says that industry influence has so distorted medical literature that she
refers to this as the “‘misinformation age’” of medical research.81  In one study,
faculty spoke frequently about how the pursuit of competitive funding “altered
the ethos of departments and entire universities.”82  Another study of the prob-
lem concluded:
Many different types of relationships may exist between sponsors of research studies
and independent investigators.  A sponsored research agreement allows the author to
retain control over the publication of study results.  A consulting agreement may not
give explicit publication rights to the investigator or author.  Consulting agreements
can also be designed to require the author to submit the manuscript for publication
only after the sponsor reviews the manuscript and provides written permission for
publication.  Generally, sponsored-research agreements are designed to protect the
academic integrity of the study.  While the research produced under these agreements
may not appear different to the journal or to the reader, the sponsorship agreement
may serve to limit the publication of findings that are “negative” from the sponsor’s
perspective.83
77. Id.
78. Carol Cruzan Morton, Company, Researchers Battle Over Data Access, 290 SCIENCE 1063, 1063
(2000).
79. See, e.g., Constance Holden, Brown Doctor Protests Firing, 277 SCIENCE 483, 483 (1997)
(describing allegations by David Kern, an occupational health doctor, that he lost his job due to a dis-
pute involving his corporate funder’s attempt to prevent him from publishing research); Douglas M.
Birch & Gary Cohn, Standing up to Industry, BALT. SUN, June 26, 2001, at 1A (reporting Dr. William
Applegate’s allegations of pressure from corporate sponsors seeking to influence his evaluation of a
calcium channel blocker).
80. Birch & Cohn, supra note 79.
81. Id.
82. Anderson, supra note 59, at 226.
83. Kevin Schulman et al., Ethics, Economics, and the Publication Policies of Major Medical Jour-
nals, 272 JAMA 154, 154 (1994).
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Such concerns seem to be borne out by at least some statistical evidence.  A
recent study covering over 1000 peer-reviewed scientific papers found that
“[i]ndustry-sponsored research is 3.6 times more likely to produce results favor-
able to the company that helped pay for it.”84  A study published in 1998 was
reported to find that “96 [percent] of the researchers who wrote favorable
articles about a controversial class of drugs for treating hypertension and angina
also had financial ties to the makers of those drugs . . . . [whereas] [a]mong
those who published articles critical of the drugs, only 37 [percent] had financial
ties.”85  Yet another study published in 1998 found that scientists receiving gifts
from the biosciences industry often “think that donors place restrictions and
expect returns that may be problematic for recipients as well as institutions.”86
Perhaps the best indirect evidence that bias can creep into “nonlitigation”
research is the position taken by numerous scientific institutions and journals
requiring disclosure of researchers’ financial conflicts of interest.  The leading
medical journals all have such disclosure requirements.87  The voluntary
Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals rec-
ommends such disclosures.88  In February 1999, the Association of American
Medical Colleges adopted similar guidelines on conflicts of interest.89  The poli-
cies of the National Science Foundation, the Public Health Service, and the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) also recognize the potential bias that
can exist in sponsored, nonlitigation research.90  As the FDA has said, its regula-
tions reflect a growing consensus in the scientific community “that certain finan-
cial arrangements between clinical investigators and product sponsors, or the
personal financial interests of clinical investigators, can potentially bias the out-
come of clinical trials.”91
84. See Hotz, supra note 68.
85. Goldie Blumenstyk, Conflict-of-Interest Fears Rise as Universities Chase Industry Support,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 22, 1998, at A41, A42 (reporting on a January 1998 study in the New
England Journal of Medicine).
86. Eric G. Campbell et al., Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: Corporate Gifts Supporting Life
Sciences Research, 279 JAMA 995, 997 (1998) (finding, inter alia, that 63% of recipients “thought that
donors expected acknowledgment in publications” and that 32% “thought donors expected prepublica-
tion review of articles or reports” stemming from the gift).
87. Patterson, supra note 51, at n.102 (citing the requirements of the New England Journal of
Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical Association, and the Lancet); see also Sheldon Krimsky
& L.S. Rothenberg, Financial Interest and Its Disclosure in Scientific Publications, 280 JAMA 225, 226
(1998).
88. Id.
89. Id. at n.160.
90. Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 21 C.F.R. § 54.1(b) (2002); Financial Disclosure
by Clinical Investigators, 63 Fed. Reg. 5233-01 (Feb. 2, 1998) (to be codified in 21 C.F.R.); Responsibil-
ity of Applicants for Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which PHS Funding is Sought, 42 C.F.R. §
50.601-.606 (2002).
91. Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,708 (proposed Sept. 22, 1994) (to
be codified in 21 C.F.R.).
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B. How the Data Amendments Can Threaten Non-Corporate-Funded
Research and Exaggerate the Potential Bias in Corporate-Funded Research
The influence corporations can wield today in the context of contractual
university-corporate research endeavors becomes generalized under the Data
Amendments.  Now, that influence can extend even to research that is sup-
ported by public funds.  The Shelby Amendment, for example, gives anyone the
right to seek access to research that is wholly supported by public, but not cor-
porate, funds.  The prospect of organized, public relations campaigns to dis-
credit the science that these objectors do not believe to be “good” is hardly far-
fetched.92  A 1995 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine related
what the author considered a partisan attack on the National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control (“NCIPC”), a center at the national Centers for Dis-
ease Control that researches the public-health aspects of injuries, by “the Heri-
tage Foundation (a conservative think tank), the Doctors for Integrity in
Research and Public Policy (an anti-gun-control physicians’ group), and the
National Rifle Association.”93  The Doctors for Integrity group posted a mes-
sage on the Internet arguing for a cut-off of NCIPC funding so as to “end the
bogus ‘public health’ assault on our civil rights” that came from NCIPC’s
“incompetent and politicized science.”94  In April 1997, a “Sounding Board”
article in the New England Journal of Medicine entitled “The Messenger Under
Attack—Intimidation of Researchers by Special-Interest Groups” reported on
other examples of what the authors saw as organized attacks on scientific find-
ings.95  That article elicited correspondence on similar incidents published in the
October 30, 1997 issue of the Journal under a collection entitled “Intimidation
of Researchers by Special-Interest Groups.”96
The use of the Data Amendments to attack science with which one dis-
agrees is already beginning to unfold.  So it is that the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, despite industry’s loss in the American Trucking litigation, is considering
92. See Joint Steering Committee, supra note 4 (stating the concerns of the National Academy of
Sciences and the National Institutes of Health that the new law could “invite[] special interest groups to
harass investigators engaged in controversial or competing work”); supra Hoagland Letter, note 6
(stating the concerns of the Council on Undergraduate Research that data integrity rules “would do
just the opposite by allowing, even requiring, the tampering of data in the name of  ‘correcting’ it”);
Hasselmo Letter, supra note 7 (stating the concern of the Association of American Universities that
guidelines on research data could “provide still another avenue for interested parties to impede release
by the government of material to which they object on political or economic grounds”).
93. Jerome P. Kassirer, A Partisan Assault on Science—The Threat to the CDC, 333 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 793, 793 (1995).
94. Id.
95. Deyo, supra note 32, at 1176-77 (alleging “coordinated attacks at scientific meetings and skillful
manipulation of the procedures for investigating scientific misconduct” in attacks on researchers
working on the health risks of lead exposure, interest-group attacks on scientists researching multiple
chemical sensitivity, and the use of the Freedom of Information Act by the pharmaceutical industry to
demand of one researcher “all records relating to study design and methodology, study protocol(s),
individual data for all study results and data, . . . meeting minutes, [and] notes”).
96. Intimidation of Researchers by Special-Interest Groups, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1314 (1997)
(letters to the editor including correspondence both critiquing and amplifying the anecdotes reported
by Deyo et al., supra note 32).
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filing a new lawsuit under the Data Amendments over EPA’s revised ozone and
particulate-matter standards.97  So it is that the Center for Regulatory Effective-
ness (“CRE”), an industry-supported entity specializing in overseeing agencies’
implementation of the Data Amendments, filed comments with OMB in
November 2002 seeking to ensure that data quality issues are adequately
addressed before the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration informs
the public through a new “Early Warning” program of the possibility of
emerging dangers from automotive defects.98  And so too has the CRE filed a
correction request under the Data Quality Act protesting a statement refer-
encing “endocrine effects in various organisms including frogs” in an EPA risk
assessment of the widely used herbicide atrazine.  In the CRE’s view, the stud-
ies on which EPA’s reference was based were not sufficiently validated,99 even
though those studies had been published in prestigious, peer-reviewed jour-
nals.100  The CRE had also threatened to sue the Department of Energy for what
it believed to be foot-dragging in adopting data quality guidelines101 until,
approximately one month later, the CRE received an advance copy of the
Department’s guidelines.  As the CRE announced on its webpage, these guide-
lines met with CRE’s approval because they adopted a particular standard of
“quality” from the Safe Drinking Water Act that, in CRE’s view, would be use-
ful in evaluating the science of global climate change.102  In February 2002, the
CRE argued to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy that
the National Assessment of Climate Change, which had been developed by
multiple agencies, failed to meet OMB’s data quality guidelines.103
97. See EPA Proposed Guidance on Data Quality Draws Fire From Industry, Advocacy Groups, 26
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 26, at 878, 879 (July 1, 2002) (“William Kovacs, vice president of envi-
ronment and regulatory affairs at the chamber, told reporters June 21 that the chamber is considering
filing a lawsuit to challenge data EPA used as it determined in 1997 to tighten air pollution emissions to
reduce ozone and particulate matter.”).
98. Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Comments Re: Reporting of Information and Documents
About Potential Defects, Retention of Records 49 CFR Part 579, OMB No. 2127-0616 (Nov. 6, 2002), at
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20021126_cre-nhtsa.pdf; see also Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Release of Auto
Safety Data is Disputed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at C9 (reporting industry’s concern that agency’s
quarterly Internet updates would disclose sensitive information that could be misused and “could
create an adversarial atmosphere that undermines safety”).
99. See Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Kansas Corn Growers Association & The Triazine
Network, Request for Correction of Information Contained in the Atrazine Environmental Risk Assess-
ment, Docket No. OPP-34237A (Nov. 25, 2002), at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/petition-atrazine2B.pdf.
100. See Carl T. Hall, From Boyhood Curiosity to Scientific Discovery—Biologist Links Pesticides to
Amphibian Deformities, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 2002, at A6, available at http://www.ourstolenfuture.org/
Commentary/News/2002/2002-1104-SFC-hayes.htm (stating that studies by Tyrone Hayes appeared in
the journal Nature and in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences).
101. Group Threatens to Sue Energy Department for Not Releasing Data Quality Guidelines, 26
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 25, at 854 (June 24, 2002).
102. See DOE’s Proposed Data Quality Guidelines Said to Include Ideas Not in Other Plans, 26
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 30, at 976, 977 (July 29, 2002).
103. Id.
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IV
CONCLUSION
In moving towards about “Daubertizing” federal agencies, the Shelby
Amendment and the Data Quality Act run the risk of delegitimizing “good
science” as the kind of goal to which no one would otherwise object.  Science is
an enormously important public resource in a free society, and there are,
accordingly, enormous benefits in maintaining public confidence in its underly-
ing integrity as a process.  Whatever possible upside the Data Amendments
may have in expanding the ability of nonscientists to correct the occasional and
inevitable scientific mistake, the possible downside of creating a world in which
science is perceived as just another category of “spin” are undoubtedly much
more profound.  Dr. Allan Bromley, a nuclear physicist at Yale and former
science advisor to President George H.W. Bush, may have had it only partly
right when he stated about the then-existing federal budget surplus: “No sci-
ence[,] no surplus.”104  The more fundamental possibility is “no science, no free-
dom.”  There is already sufficiently worrisome evidence of growing, undue
influence on the integrity of scientific inquiry.  The Data Amendments threaten
to make a political and judicial football out of a core public resource—the insti-
tution of scientific inquiry itself.  The Data Amendments should be repealed.
104. Allan Bromley, Science and Surpluses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2001, at A19.
